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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court 
granting in part petitioner-appellee/cross-appellant Clifford 
Smith's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district 
court held that certain comments made by the prosecutor 
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at the penalty phase of Smith's trial for first-degree murder 
violated Smith's rights pursuant to the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court further held 
that the failure of Smith's attorney to object to these 
comments violated Smith's right to the effective assistance 
of counsel pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The district court rejected Smith's claim that 
instructions to the jury at the guilt phase of the trial, 
concerning the elements of first-degree murder pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law, violated Smith's right to a fair trial 
pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Similarly, the district court rejected Smith's 




or "the Commonwealth") contend that the district court 
erred in its determination that the prosecutor's closing 
argument at the penalty phase, and the failure of Smith's 
attorney to object to that argument, violated Smith's federal 
constitutional rights. Smith cross-appeals, contending that 
the district court erred in denying him habeas relief with 
regard to his conviction for first-degree murder, and in 
rejecting his other arguments for granting relief based on 
alleged defects at the penalty phase. 
 
We agree with Smith that errors in the jury instructions 
at the guilt phase of his trial violated his rights pursuant to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
thus do not reach the district court's holding that errors at 
the penalty phase violated Smith's rights pursuant to the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We also do not 
reach Smith's arguments concerning other claims of error 
that occurred at the penalty phase. Accordingly, we will 
vacate the judgment of the district court in part, reverse in 




On November 22, 1983, in the Court of Common Pleas, 
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Smith was convicted offirst- 
degree murder, among other crimes. The evidence at trial 
showed that on June 17 of that year, Smith and Roland 
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Alston entered a pharmacy with the intention of robbing it, 
that they forced three persons inside the store to lie in a 
prone position on the floor as they committed the robbery, 
and that one of the robbery victims, Richard Sharp, 
sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. 
 
Yvette Barrow and Cheryl Yancey, who later pled guilty to 
being accomplices to the robbery, testified that Alston and 
Smith committed the robbery while Barrow and Yancey 
waited in Barrow's car. One eyewitness saw Alston and 
Smith enter and leave the pharmacy at the time of the 
robbery. A second eyewitness saw the pair walk in the 
direction of the pharmacy just prior to the robbery. A third 
eyewitness identified the car in which Smith and Alston 
were traveling just after the robbery. All three independent 
eyewitnesses identified the clothing worn by the robbers, 
which was later found at the homes of Alston, Yancey, and 
Frances Atkins, Smith's former girlfriend. Items taken from 
the three robbery victims were later found at the homes of 
Barrow and Yancey. 
 
Although there was evidence that both Alston and Smith 
carried handguns that day, the evidence tended to show 
that Smith actually committed the killing. According to the 
Commonwealth, Barrow testified that immediately after the 
murder, Alston yelled at Smith, "Why did you shoot the 
motherf[uck]er, why did you shoot him?" Appellant's Br. at 
11.1 Smith responded, "He walked into the store and he 
scared me -- the guy lifted his head and I had to do it, I 
had to do it." Id. Barrow also testified that Smith told 
Alston that "[s]ince [Smith] did the murder, he wanted the 
ring" that was one of the proceeds of the robbery. Id. 
Yancey similarly testified that Alston yelled at Smith, "Why 
did you shoot that motherf[uck]er, man? You almost shot 
me," to which Smith replied, "I had to." Id. She also testified 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because Smith has not contested the version of the trial testimony 
related in the Commonwealth's briefs, we accept this version as accurate 
for purposes of this appeal. Nonetheless, we feel the need to express our 
bafflement at the Commonwealth's disregard of 3d Cir. LAR 30.3(a) 
(1993) ("Relevant portions of a trial transcript . . . referred to in the 
briefs shall be included in the appendix . . . ."). In light of the importance 
of the testimony in question to the Commonwealth's position, it cannot 
be disputed that this testimony is "[r]elevant." 
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that Smith stated that "he should have the ring because 
he's the one that killed the man." Id. There was also 
evidence that Smith's shoes had human blood on them. 
Finally, there was evidence that unfired cartridges found at 
Yancey's house had been loaded into and ejected from 
Alston's pistol, indicating that Alston's weapon had not 
been fired. 
 
At the guilt phase of the trial, the district attorney made 
the following comments in closing argument: 
 
[W]ho shot Richard Sharp is of no moment in this trial, 
because as His Honor will tell you, it makes no 
difference under the law and under the facts. It doesn't 
make one bit of difference who shot Mr. Sharp, 
because if you find as a fact, and I suggest you can 
based on the evidence, that Richard Sharp was killed 
by either Roland Alston or Clifford Smith, you canfind 
as a fact that there was murder in the first degree. It 
makes no difference who pulled the trigger. The acts of 
one accomplice are the acts of the other. The doings of 
one are the doings of the other. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . [I]t makes no difference who fired the fatal shot 
. . . [F]or your purposes, it doesn't make any difference. 
The act of one is the act of the other. . . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . [I]f you find that this defendant or both 
defendants or either of them had the conscious purpose 
to take human life, you can find as a matter of fact and 
as a matter of law that it's murder in the first degree. 
. . . 
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . [I]f you find that either Smith or Alston fired that 
bullet . . . if you find that either did this, both as 
conspirators or as accomplices are guilty of the crime of 
first degree murder. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . Does the evidence indicate that Clifford Smith or 
Roland Alston, either or both of them, made a 
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conscious decision to take human life, a willful, a 
deliberate, an intentional killing, no accident? 
 
Cross App. at 1007-08, 1010, 1012-13, 1014, 1017 
(emphasis added). 
 
The court first instructed the jury on homicide without 
reference to any specific offense or degree: 
 
[I]f . . . you find that Smith and Alston were 
accomplices of each other, then it is not important for 
you to determine which one actually pulled the trigger 
that brought about the killing of Richard Sharp, if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the two did 
so and were [sic] acting as the accomplice of each other 
at the time. In order, however, to find Clifford Smith to 
be guilty, you need not conclude, as I said, that he was 
the actor; that is, if I can use the word "shooter," but 
he was, nevertheless, acting as an accomplice of Alston 
and it was his intent of promoting or facilitating that 
act and the killing was done in furtherance of the 
robberies, if you so find, then he would be guilty as 
though he were the actual perpetrator. . . . 
 
 . . . [T]he Commonwealth must prove all of the 
elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
they do not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
which of the two, Smith or Alston, actually brought 
about the killing of Richard Sharp by showing who 
pulled the trigger and placing [sic] the shot in his head. 
If, and I emphasize this, you find that one was the 
accomplice of the other and that one of the two actually 
performed the killing, you, the jurors, need not agree on 
the role or roles played by the respective parties; that is, 
by this defendant and his accomplice, if you find that 
that was the position of both, provided that each of you 
is satisfied that the crime was actually perpetrated by 
the defendant or by the accomplice of the defendant.  
Conversely, if you find that one was not the accomplice 
of the other but that a criminal homicide occurred, 
then you must determine who performed the act of 
killing and, of course, it follows that if Alston was the 
killer and Smith was not his accomplice, he, Smith, 
would not be guilty of the crime of murder for the 
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Commonwealth has not proven this accomplice theory 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Id. at 1030-31, 1031-32 (emphasis added). 
 
The court then instructed the jury specifically on first- 
degree and second-degree murder: 
 
[T]he elements of first degree murder are the unlawful 
killing of another person done intentionally; that is, 
willfully, deliberately and with premeditation, plus 
malice, as I will define that term to you. If these 
elements have been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you may, on the theory that one was the 
perpetrator and the other the accomplice, find Clifford 
Smith guilty of murder in the first degree . .. . 
 
 . . . You may find the defendant guilty of second 
degree murder if you are satisfied that the following 
elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, again you must find that a person caused the 
death of Richard Sharp. Secondly, that the defendant, 
or an accomplice of the defendant, was the person who 
killed him. Thirdly, that the killing was committed 
while the defendant was engaged, or an accomplice was 
engaged, in the commission of . . . the felony of 
robbery. Fourth, that the act of the defendant, or the 
defendant's accomplice, that brought about the killing 
and death of Richard Sharp was done in furtherance of 
that robbery. Fifth, that the killing was with malice on 
the part of the defendant [which] may be inferred by 
you if you conclude that the defendant was engaging 
in, or was an accomplice in, the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony dangerous to human 
life . . . . 
 
Id. at 1035, 1035-36 (emphasis added). 
 
The court then instructed the jury on the crime of 
conspiracy, without reference to a specific substantive 
crime: 
 
You should . . . determine . . . whether there was the 
requisite intent to enter into this conspiracy to commit 
the robbery and the killing which the Commonwealth 
contends flowed therefrom or whether there was the 
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requisite intent to enter in and be the accomplice with 
the other in bringing this about. That is to say, did 
Clifford Smith agree, although not necessarily by 
words, but by conduct and circumstances to bring 
about this robbery which, in turn, led to the ultimate 
shooting, so the Commonwealth contends, and the 
killing of Richard Sharp? If so, then the major basis of 
conspiratorial liability exists as to him. 
 
Id. at 1047-48 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, the court distinguished among the different 
degrees of murder: 
 
You would . . . have to decide whether the act of the 
perpetrator, or his accomplice, at the time of the killing 
was acting [sic] with malice, as we have defined that 
term to you. Was he acting willfully, deliberately and 
with premeditation, although at that time not having 
the specific intent to kill, but having the specific intent 
to inflict grievous bodily harm upon Richard Sharp, 
because that really is the distinction between third 
degree murder and first degree murder. . . . 
 
 If you would conclude that there was specific intent 
to take life, you would then have to determine if it was 
second degree murder, or as we call it felony murder, 
because it involves killing incidental to a felony. . . . 
[F]or persons to be accomplices in felony murder they 
must have a common design. In other words, the 
shared intent to commit that felony, the robbery in this 
case, and in furtherance thereof the killing was 
perpetrated as a natural act which flowed from the 
robbery itself. However, . . . even though you would 
conclude that there was the felony of robbery 
committed, but would further conclude that all of the 
elements of first degree murder were present, you . . . 
would be justified in returning a verdict of first degree 
murder, if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the killing was intentional; that is, that there was 
a specific conscious intent to kill and this was done 
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. 
 
Id. at 1057-58 (emphasis added). 
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Smith was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder 
and conspiracy to commit murder. He was not convicted of 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At the penalty 
phase of the trial, the jury found two aggravating factors 
and no mitigating factors. The jury imposed the death 
penalty, which it was required to do under these 
circumstances pursuant to Pennsylvania law. See 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1982). 
 
Smith filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by 
the trial court on June 18, 1985. Smith subsequently was 
sentenced to death. He then appealed his conviction and 
sentence to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On July 
29, 1986, the judgment was affirmed, and Smith's petition 
to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of 
certiorari was denied thereafter. See Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 513 A.2d 1371 (Pa. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 
951, 107 S.Ct. 1617 (1987) ("Smith I"). 
 
The Governor of Pennsylvania subsequently signed 
Smith's death warrant, fixing his execution for November 
13, 1990. On October 16, 1991,2 Smith filed a petition in 
the Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County, pursuant to 
the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§9541-9546 (West 1996 Supp.). His 
execution was stayed several days later. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition. The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed on November 22, 
1994, and the United States Supreme Court denied Smith's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 
650 A.2d 863 (Pa. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S.Ct. 1799 (1995). 
 
In May of 1995, the Governor of Pennsylvania again 
signed Smith's death warrant, fixing July 11, 1995, as the 
date of execution. On June 30, 1995, the district court 
granted Smith a stay of execution. Smith subsequently filed 
the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). That 
court held an evidentiary hearing. On February 22, 1996, 
the court granted the petition in part and denied it in part 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The record does not indicate why Smith's execution was stayed past 
November 13, 1990. 
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on the grounds that the prosecutor's comments in 
summation at the penalty phase violated Smith's Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (1985), and 
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446 (1983). 
The district court also held that the failure of Smith's 
counsel to object to the closing argument constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court rejected 
Smith's contention, regarding the guilt phase, that the jury 
instructions on first-degree murder denied him due 
process. It also rejected Smith's additional arguments 
concerning the penalty phase that his sentence violated the 
federal constitution. The court ordered that Smith be either 
re-sentenced or released from confinement within 180 days, 
and stayed its order pending appeal. See Smith v. Horn, No. 
CIV. A. 95-3671, 1996 WL 172047 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1996). 
 




As an initial matter, we find it necessary to address two 
issues raised by the dissent. The dissent suggests, for the 
first time, that we require the parties to brief the threshold 
procedural issues of exhaustion of state remedies and 
procedural default. See Dissent slip op. at 38, 40. We note 
at the outset that the Commonwealth never raised either of 
these issues at any time: not in the district court, not in its 




The dissent concedes that it is likely an exhaustion 
argument would fail on the grounds that further state 
review of the due process issue would be foreclosed to 
Smith. See id. at 37-38. Nevertheless, the dissent presses 
the point, arguing that this might present a case where the 
Pennsylvania courts would apply the narrow "miscarriage of 
justice" exception to the stringent requirements of the 
PCRA. See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 681-83 (3d Cir. 
1996). In Doctor, 96 F.3d at 683, we concluded that we 
ought to require exhaustion unless there is "no chance that 
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the Pennsylvania courts would find a miscarriage of 
justice." 
 
However, in that case, the exhaustion issue was raised 
and addressed in the district court. See id. at 678. Where 
the issue was never raised in the district court, we are 
afforded discretion pursuant to Granberry v. Greer, 481 
U.S. 129, 134, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1675 (1987), to "determine 
whether the interests of comity and federalism will be better 
served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a 
series of additional state and district court proceedings 
before reviewing the merits of the petitioner's claim." See 
also Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1233 
(3d Cir. 1992); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 
1987). We must exercise our discretion on a case-by-case 
basis and with reference to the values of, not only comity 
and federalism, but also "judicial efficiency," Granberry, 
481 U.S. at 135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675, and "the ends of 
justice," Keller v. Petsock, 853 F.2d 1122, 1127 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 
The dissent suggests that we ought to exercise our 
discretion in favor of requiring exhaustion in this case on 
the ground that it "falls squarely within" the category of 
cases that " `present[ ] an issue on which an unresolved 
question of fact or of state law might have an important 
bearing,' " Dissent slip op. at 36 (quoting Granberry, 481 
U.S. at 134-35, 107 S.Ct. at 1675) (alteration added), and 
"it would be helpful to have the benefit of a decision by the 
Pennsylvania courts on the underlying issue of state law." 
Id. at 6. See Brown, 819 F.2d at 399; cf. Zettlemoyer v. 
Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 309-10 (3d Cir. 1991). However, 
this case presents no "unresolved question . . . of state 
law." Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134, 107 S.Ct. at 1675. The 
only question of state law presented -- the elements of first- 
degree murder in Pennsylvania -- has been resolved by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, not once but twice. See infra 
at 16-18. No one disputes that specific intent to kill is one 
of those elements. All remaining questions presented by 
this case -- whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury understood its instructions in a certain way, 
whether this understanding had the effect of relieving the 
Commonwealth of the burden of proving this element 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether this error was 
harmless -- present issues of federal law. 
 
Accordingly, we see no reason to delay review of this 
petition in order to provide briefing on an issue the 
Commonwealth never raised in any court and on which 
even the dissent concedes the Commonwealth has very 




The dissent also suggests that we direct the parties to 
brief the related issue of procedural default. The dissent 
correctly notes that we and several of our sister circuits 
have held that this issue may be raised sua sponte by the 
court of appeals. See Dissent at 38 (citing Hull v. Freeman, 
932 F.2d 159, 164 n.4 (3d Cir. 1991), overruled on other 
grounds by Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1992), 
Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1994), 
Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1993), and 
Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502-04 & n.4 (10th 
Cir. 1992)). Nonetheless, it is evident from these cases that 
whether we do so is discretionary, and that our discretion 
is guided by the same considerations as those discussed in 
Granberry. See Hull, 932 F.2d at 164 n.4; Washington, 996 
F.2d at 1448-49; Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 504. 
 
In Washington, 996 F.2d at 1449-50, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that it might be 
inappropriate for the court to raise the issue of procedural 
default sua sponte where " `it is evident that a miscarriage 
of justice has occurred' " (quoting Granberry, 481 U.S. at 
135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675). The court also recognized that 
"miscarriage of justice" in this context should be defined 
somewhat more loosely than in the nonexhaustion context 
because "[u]nlike in exhaustion cases, if we decline to reach 
the merits in a procedural default case, the defendant has 
no further recourse to either state or federal relief." Id. at 
1450. Nevertheless, the court narrowly limited the 
application of the miscarriage of justice exception to those 
cases where the habeas petitioner challenges the validity of 
the trial itself and not just the conviction, and those cases 
where the claimed federal violation was the product of 
malice. See id.; see also Ortiz, 19 F.3d at 715. 
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We believe, as did Judge Oakes in dissent in that case, 
that the court unduly limited the meaning of "miscarriage 
of justice" in contravention of the language of Granberry, 
481 U.S. at 135, 107 S.Ct. at 1675. See Washington, 996 
F.2d at 1454 (Oakes, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge 
Oakes, and with Judge Stahl of the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, that " `miscarriage of justice' should include 
cases where the record is well developed and the merits 
strongly support the petitioner's claim." Id. at 1453 (Oakes, 
J., dissenting); see also Ortiz, 19 F.3d at 717 (Stahl, J., 
dissenting). 
 
In this case, not only do the merits strongly support 
Smith's claim, as we shall demonstrate, but the record as 
it relates to the merits is as well-developed as it can be. We 
have been presented with the entirety of the charge 
delivered at Smith's trial. We can lay alongside this charge 
the unequivocal holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in two separate cases that specific intent to kill is an 
essential element of first-degree murder. 
 
By contrast, the record with regard to the procedural 
default issue itself is sparse. For example, we have not been 
provided with the crucial jury instruction defining first- 
degree murder requested by Smith's trial counsel and 
rejected by the trial court. There is similarly nothing in the 
record with regard to whether Smith can show "cause" for 
the alleged default (such as by showing that appellate 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective) and "prejudice" 
resulting therefrom, or that the procedural rule does not 
provide an independent and adequate basis for precluding 
habeas review. See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 683. Thus, 
consideration of the procedural default issue at this late 
stage in the proceedings would likely require not simply 
supplemental briefing but a remand to the district court for 
supplemental fact finding. In these circumstances, where 
relief is "plainly warranted," Granberry, 481 U.S. at 135, 
107 S.Ct. at 1676, and consideration of the procedural 
default defense would result in undue delay, see Odum v. 
Boone, 62 F.3d 327, 330 (10th Cir. 1995); Manlove v. 
Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 476 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992), we exercise 
our discretion to decline to raise that defense sua sponte. 
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C. 
 
With regard to both nonexhaustion and procedural 
default, we are also persuaded that when the state has 
never raised an issue in either the district court or this 
Court we should be even less inclined to raise it sua sponte 
than when the state either has raised the issue here only 
belatedly or has raised it in the district court but has not 
pursued that line of attack in the court of appeals. But see 
Washington, 996 F.2d at 1448 n.3 (stating that complete 
failure to raise defense should be treated same as belatedly 
raising defense); Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 504 n.6 (same). In 
any of these situations, consideration of the issue 
contravenes our standard practice. However, where the 
issue has been raised either in the district court or the 
court of appeals, we are at least maintaining our roles as 
judges, addressing only the issues flagged, at some point, 
by the parties. Moreover, we are often aided in our 
endeavor by the fact that the district court has addressed 
the issue. 
 
By contrast, where the state has never raised the issue at 
all, in any court, raising the issue sua sponte puts us in 
the untenable position of ferreting out possible defenses 
upon which the state has never sought to rely. When we do 
so, we come dangerously close to acting as advocates for 
the state rather than as impartial magistrates. See United 
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1877 
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The rule 
that points not argued will not be considered . . . at least 
in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary 
system of justice from the inquisitorial one."); accord 
Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 505. While considerations of 
federalism and comity sometimes weigh in favor of raising 
such issues sua sponte, consideration of that other great 
pillar of our judicial system -- restraint -- cuts sharply in 
the other direction. 
 
We certainly have the discretion to raise these issues sua 
sponte. As Granberry and its progeny direct, that discretion 
should be exercised with reference to the values of 
federalism and comity, judicial efficiency, and the ends of 
justice. In cases in which an issue has not been raised by 
either party in either the district court or in this Court, we 
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will decline to address the issue unless consideration of 
these factors clearly indicates that we should depart from 
our standard practice. We apply this presumption in such 
cases lest we subtly transform our adversarial system into 
an inquisitorial one. 
 
The dissent has not persuaded us that consideration of 
federalism and comity, judicial efficiency, and the ends of 
justice clearly dictate that we consider the defenses of 
nonexhaustion and procedural default. Accordingly, we 




Smith argues that the jury instructions rendered by the 
trial court erroneously informed the jury that Smith could 
be convicted of first-degree murder even if he did not have 
the specific intent to kill. He asserts that the jury was 
incorrectly instructed that if it found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that one of the men had the specific intent to kill, 
and that Smith intended to commit the robbery that 
resulted in the killing, this would be sufficient to convict 
Smith of first-degree murder. He further argues that this 
instruction was incorrect under Pennsylvania law, and that 
this incorrect instruction violated his constitutional rights. 
The district court summarily rejected Smith's contention, 
stating: "Smith has raised several other arguments in his 
petition concerning both the guilt and penalty phases of his 
1983 trial. These we find to be without merit." Smith v. 
Horn, 1996 WL 172047, at *15. 
 
We conclude from a fair reading of the jury instructions 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted 
Smith of first-degree murder without finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he intended that Sharp be killed. 
Such an instruction is contrary to Pennsylvania law. We 
hold that these jury instructions had the effect of relieving 
the Commonwealth of its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt one of the elements of first-degree murder 
under Pennsylvania law. The delivery of these improper 
instructions amounted to a violation of Smith's right to a 
fair trial pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, we hold that this 
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constitutional error was not harmless and that Smith must 
be discharged unless the Commonwealth determines to 




Under Pennsylvania law, both today and at the time of 
Smith's trial, an accomplice or co-conspirator in a crime 
during which a killing occurs may not be convicted of first- 
degree murder unless the Commonwealth proves that he 
harbored the specific intent to kill. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2502(a) (West 1983); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 
A.2d 961, 962-63, 964 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. 
Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1982). This is so even 
where the identity of the actual killer is unknown. See 
Huffman, 638 A.2d at 964-65 (Papadakos, J., dissenting). 
The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant 
actually performed the killing, see Commonwealth v. 
Bachert, 412 A.2d 580, 583 (Pa. Super. 1979), aff'd in part, 
rev'd on other grounds in part, 453 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1982), but 
it must prove he intended for the killing to occur. In other 
words, felony-murder simpliciter does not constitute murder 
in the first degree in Pennsylvania. 
 
In Bachert, 453 A.2d at 933-34, the evidence showed that 
the defendant and a cohort committed a kidnaping and 
robbery, during the course of which the cohort killed the 
victim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote that to 
constitute first-degree murder, the evidence had to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant harbored "a 
specific intent to kill." Id. at 935. It wrote: 
 
To determine the kind of homicide of which the 
accomplice [defendant] is guilty, it is necessary to look 
to his state of mind; the requisite mental state must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be one which the 
accomplice harbored and cannot depend upon proof of 
intent to kill only in the principal. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In Huffman, 638 A.2d at 962, the trial court had advised 
the jury that 
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"in order to find a Defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree, you must find that the Defendant caused 
the death of another person, or that an accomplice or 
co-conspirator caused the death of another person . That 
is, you must find that the Defendant's act or the act of 
an accomplice or co-conspirator is the legal cause of 
death of [the victim], and therefore you must determine 
if the killing was intentional." 
 
(quoting trial transcript) (emphasis added) (alteration in 
original). This, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, was 
"patently erroneous" and "an outright misstatement of the 
law on a fundamental issue relating to culpability." Id. The 
court wrote that Bachert "express[ly] and unambiguous[ly]" 
held that an accomplice to an underlying felony that results 
in death could be convicted of first-degree murder only if 
the Commonwealth proves that the accomplice specifically 
intended to kill. Id. at 962-63. 
 
The Commonwealth cites in its reply brief two cases in 
support of the proposition that a shared intent to enter into 
a conspiracy to commit a crime is sufficient to confer 
criminal liability for a killing that is the natural and 
probable result of the conspiracy, even if the killing were 
not shown to be specifically intended by the defendant. See 
Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867, 870 (Pa. 1976); 
Commonwealth v. La, 640 A.2d 1336, 1345-46 (Pa. Super. 
1994). However, neither of these cases involved first-degree 
murder. See Roux, 350 A.2d at 868 (second-degree murder 
and conspiracy);3 La, 640 A.2d at 1340 (third-degree 
murder and conspiracy); see also Huffman, 638 A.2d at 964 
n.9 (criticizing dissent for relying on cases involving 
manslaughter and lesser degrees of murder). As the 
Commonwealth unambiguously conceded at oral argument, 
Huffman and Bachert make clear that specific intent to 
commit a killing, not simply intent to commit some other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Additionally, the events in Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867, 869 
(Pa. 1976), took place on November 10, 1973. Before March 26, 1974, 
the definition of murder in the first degree in Pennsylvania included 
felony-murder. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2502, Historical Note (1983). 
Thus, Roux would be inapposite even if the defendant there had been 
convicted of first-degree murder. 
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crime from which a killing results, is a prerequisite to a 
conviction for first-degree murder in Pennsylvania. Cf. Tison 
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 175 n.13, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1697 
n.13 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing Pennsylvania 
as a jurisdiction that "restrict[s] the imposition of capital 




Our analysis of jury instructions claimed to impair a 
constitutional right "must focus initially on the specific 
language challenged." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 
315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971 (1985); see also Rock v. 
Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
The allegedly constitutionally infirm language must be 
considered in the context of the charge as a whole. See 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 
(1991); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 752 (3d Cir. 
1995); Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 
1994). The proper inquiry is " `whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 
instructions in a way' that violates the Constitution." 
Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198 (1990)) 
(emphasis added); see also Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1, 
6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994); Flamer, 68 F.3d at 752. 
 
A fair reading of the jury instructions given in this case 
permitted the jury to convict Smith of murder in the first 
degree without first finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Smith intended that Sharp be killed. Portions of the 
instructions are ambiguous as to the requisite finding of 
intent. Other portions affirmatively inform the jury that it 
need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith 
specifically intended that the victim die in order for Smith 
to be guilty of murder in the first degree. Taken as a whole, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood 
the instructions in this way. 
 
One of the two portions of the jury charge that 
specifically mentions first-degree murder reads as follows: 
 
[T]he elements of first degree murder are the unlawful 
killing of another person done intentionally; that is, 
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willfully, deliberately and with premeditation, plus 
malice, as I will define that term to you. If these 
elements have been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you may, on the theory that one was the 
perpetrator and the other the accomplice, find Clifford 
Smith guilty of murder in the first degree . .. . 
 
Cross App. at 1035 (emphasis added). Taken in isolation, 
this charge might convey the idea that the jury must find 
that Smith harbored the specific intent to kill Sharp. This 
interpretation would be reasonable only if the jury were to 
understand the word "accomplice" to mean "accomplice in 
the killing," and not simply "accomplice in the robbery." 
Only in that way would the instructions convey the critical 
idea that Smith must be found to have intended to kill 
Sharp for Smith to be found guilty of first-degree murder. 
 
Taken together with the remainder of the pertinent 
instructions, it is clear that jury was not made to 
understand "accomplice" in this way. In other portions of 
the charge, in which the trial court mentioned the killing 
but did not specifically discuss first-degree murder, the 
court generally did not clarify whether it was using 
"accomplice" in reference to the robbery, the killing, or 
both. Further, when it did make the meaning of 
"accomplice" reasonably clear, it appears that the court was 
using that term in reference to the robbery only. 
 
For example, the court instructed: 
 
[T]he Commonwealth must prove all of the elements of 
the case beyond a reasonable doubt, but [it] do[es] not 
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt which of the 
two, Smith or Alston, actually brought about the killing 
of Richard Sharp by showing who pulled the trigger 
and plac[ed] the shot in his head. If, and I emphasize 
this, you find that one was the accomplice of the other 
and that one of the two actually performed the killing, 
you, the jurors, need not agree on the role or roles 
played by the respective parties; that is, by this 
defendant and his accomplice, if you find that that was 
the position of both, provided that each of you is 
satisfied that the crime was actually perpetrated by the 
defendant or by the accomplice of the defendant. 
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Conversely, if you find that one was not the accomplice 
of the other but that a criminal homicide occurred, 
then you must decide who performed the act of killing 
and, of course, it follows that if Alston was the killer 
and Smith was not his accomplice, he, Smith, would not 
be guilty of the crime of murder for the Commonwealth 
has not proven this accomplice theory beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Id. at 1031-32 (emphasis added). 
 
The court also instructed: 
 
[I]f . . . you find that Smith and Alston were 
accomplices of each other, then it is not important for 
you to determine which one actually pulled the trigger 
that brought about the killing of Richard Sharp, if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the two did 
so and were [sic] acting as the accomplice of each other 
at the time. In order, however, to find Clifford Smith to 
be guilty, you need not conclude, as I said that he was 
the actor; that is, if I can use the word "shooter," but 
he was, nevertheless, acting as an accomplice of Alston 
and it was his intent of promoting or facilitating that 
act and the killing was done in furtherance of the 
robberies, if you so find, then he would be guilty as 
though he were the actual perpetrator. 
 
Id. at 1030-31 (emphasis added). 
 
The jury was further instructed on "the distinction 
between third degree murder and first degree murder." Id. 
at 1057. Murder in the third degree occurs where"the 
perpetrator,4 or his accomplice . . . [w]as . . . acting willfully, 
deliberately and with premeditation, although . . . not 
having the specific intent to kill." Id. (emphasis added). The 
clear implication is that first-degree murder occurs where 
"the perpetrator, or his accomplice" did have "the specific 
intent to kill." 
 
In these portions of the charge, the court did not clarify 
whether "accomplice" means "accomplice in the killing," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court presumably meant "the defendant": by definition, the 
"perpetrator" necessarily did the "acting." 
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"accomplice in the robbery," or both. The charge thus 
blurred the distinction between "accomplice in the robbery" 
and "accomplice in the killing," leading the jury to believe 
that an accomplice for one purpose is an accomplice for all 
purposes. This confusion was exacerbated when, in the 
course of enumerating the elements of second-degree 
murder, the court repeatedly used the word "accomplice" to 
mean "accomplice in the robbery." Without an explicit 
disclaimer, it is extremely unlikely that the jury understood 
the same word to have two different meanings when used 
only moments apart in the same charge. The charge thus 
allowed Smith to be convicted of first-degree murder if the 
jury found that either he or his accomplice in the robbery 
intended to kill Sharp. 
 
Additionally, with regard to the conspiracy counts, the 
court instructed: "You should . . . determine . .. whether 
there was the requisite intent to enter into this conspiracy 
to commit the robbery and the killing which the 
Commonwealth contends flowed therefrom or whether there 
was the requisite intent to enter into and be the accomplice 
with the other in bringing this about" Id. at 1047 (emphasis 
added). In this portion of the charge, it is unclear whether 
one could have the "requisite intent to enter into th[e] 
conspiracy to commit the robbery," without also having the 
"requisite intent to enter into the conspiracy to commit the 
. . . killing which the Commonwealth contends flowed" from 
the robbery. It is likely that a reasonable juror would have 
inferred that the "requisite intent to enter into th[e] 
conspiracy to commit the robbery" also necessarily 
establishes the "requisite intent to enter into th[e] 
conspiracy to commit . . . the killing which . . . flowed 
therefrom." The court's conflation of the two independent 
requirements of intent was aggravated by the court's next 
instruction that the jury determine "whether there was the 
requisite intent to enter into and be the accomplice with the 
other in bringing this about," without clarifying whether the 
"this" referred to the robbery, the killing, or both. 
 
The court immediately attempted to explain the above 
instruction, but in doing so it conveyed the impression that 
Smith was criminally liable for conspiracy to commit 
murder if he intended to enter into a conspiracy to commit 
robbery: 
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That is to say, did Clifford Smith agree, although not 
necessarily by words, but by conduct and 
circumstances to bring about this robbery which, in 
turn, led to the ultimate shooting, so the Commonwealth 
contends, and the killing of Richard Sharp? If so, then 
the major basis of conspiratorial liability exists as to 
him. 
 
Id. at 1047-48 (emphasis added). The court did not clarify 
to which crime this "conspiratorial liability" applies; the 
charge was given in the context of the general conspiracy 
instruction. Thus, it is likely that the jury understood this 
charge as instructing that Smith could be found guilty of 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder if he intended to 
commit the robbery, even if he did not intend that the 
killing be committed. 
 
The closest the court came to instructing the jury that 
specific intent on the part of Smith was necessary to 
convict him of first-degree murder was the following: "[Y]ou 
. . . would be justified in returning a verdict of first degree 
murder, if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the killing was intentional; that is, that there was a specific 
conscious intent to kill and this was done willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation." Id. at 1058 (emphasis 
added). However, this language fails to convey the crucial 
point that the jury must find that Smith, as opposed to 
Alston, intended the killing to occur in order for Smith to 
be found guilty of murder in the first degree. Thus, this 
portion of the charge is "not rhetorically inconsistent," 
Rock, 959 F.2d at 1248, with the portions that convey the 
idea that an intent on the part of Alston to kill, coupled 
with Smith's participation in the robbery, rendered Smith 
guilty of first-degree murder. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that we are bound by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's determination, on Smith's 
direct appeal, that the instructions fairly conveyed to the 
jury the elements of first-degree murder. The court wrote: 
"We have reviewed the record in the present case and find 
no inadequacies in the trial court's instructions as to 
elements of the crime of murder of the first degree and as 
to pertinent requirements of criminal culpability." Smith I, 
513 A.2d at 1377. Nonetheless, where an allegedly faulty 
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jury charge implicates a habeas petitioner's federal 
constitutional rights, as we conclude in the next section 
this charge did, we have an independent duty to ascertain 
how a reasonable jury would have interpreted the 
instructions at issue. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 315-16, 105 
S.Ct. at 1972; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516-17, 99 S.Ct. at 
2455; Kontakis, 19 F.3d at 116. 
 
The dissent contends that the trial court's initial 
rendition of the meaning of "accomplice" pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law adequately conveyed to the jury that each 
subsequent use of the term was offense-specific. See 
Dissent slip op. at 42-43. The court instructed: 
 
[A]n accomplice is a person if with the intent of 
promoting or facilitating the commission of a crime he 
solicits, commands, encourages or requests the other 
person or persons to commit that crime or crimes, or 
aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person 
in the planning or committing the [sic] crime. 
 
App. at 1029. Yet nothing in this charge would lead the 
jury to think that, when the court instructed the jury on 
murder, and the court used the word "accomplice," that 
word meant only "accomplice in the murder." Indeed, this 
charge reinforces the notion that an accomplice for one 
purpose is an accomplice for all purposes. There is at least 
a reasonable likelihood that, without further elaboration, 
the jurors understood the instruction as stating that if 
Smith harbored "the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of a crime [robbery] [and] he solicit[ed], 
command[ed], encourage[d] or request[ed] [Alston] to 
commit that crime [robbery] or aid[ed], agree[d] to aid, or 
attempt[ed] to aid [Alston] in . . . planning or committing 
the crime [robbery]," then Smith is "an accomplice." Id. 
(emphasis added). The dissent seeks mightily to read into 
this charge the additional words that might have conveyed 
the correct impression -- "an accomplice in that crime" or 
"an accomplice for purposes of that crime." That critical 
impression, however, was not conveyed. 
 
The Commonwealth urges that, taken as a whole, the 
charge informed the jury that it must find that Smith 
intended for the killing to occur in order to convict him of 
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first-degree murder. However, the Commonwealth has cited 
us no additional language from the charge concerning the 
elements of first-degree murder. Indeed, we have quoted 
above the entirety of the charge as pertinent to the first- 
degree murder count and, taken as a whole, we must 
conclude that there is at least a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury understood the charge as imposing upon the 
Commonwealth no burden of proving that Smith intended 





Having determined that the jury instructions in this case 
were incorrect, we must further determine whether the 
error is of constitutional magnitude. " `[I]t is well 
established that a state court's misapplication of its own 
law does not generally raise a constitutional claim. The 
federal courts have no supervisory authority over state 
judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct 
wrongs of constitutional dimension.' " Johnson v. 
Rosemeyer, No. 96-1861, 1997 WL 318064, at *5 (3d Cir. 
June 13, 1997) (quoting Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 
877, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc)) (alteration and 
emphasis added). However, this does not foreclose the 
possibility that, in the rare case, "a state court's 
misapplication of its own law" may itself result in a 
"wrong[ ] of constitutional dimension." In other words, a 
state court's misapplication of its own law, in and of itself, 
cannot be corrected by a federal court. However, when that 
misapplication has the effect of depriving a person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the resulting federal 
constitutional error can be corrected by a federal habeas 
court. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49, 113 
S.Ct. 2112, 2121 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). On the other hand, "errors of state law cannot 
be repackaged as federal errors simply by citing the Due 
Process Clause." Johnson, 1997 WL 318064 at *6. We 
conclude that the jury instruction at issue here was not 
merely an error of state law. By removing the 
Commonwealth's burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
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doubt one of the essential elements of the crime of first- 
degree murder, the instruction also contravened the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
It is axiomatic that Pennsylvania may, within certain 
constitutional limits, define first-degree murder in whatever 
way the Commonwealth sees fit. See McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2415-16 
(1986); Johnson, 1997 WL 318064 at *6. It certainly may 
include within that definition felony-murder. Indeed, many 
states do include such killings in their definitions of first- 
degree murder. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 152-54 & nn.5-9, 
107 S.Ct. at 1683-86 & nn.5-9. Pennsylvania itself defined 
first-degree murder in this way until 1974. See 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 2502, Historical Note. The Supreme Court has 
held that the inclusion of felony-murder within the 
definition of first-degree murder, and the consequent 
imposition of the death penalty, does no violence to the 
federal Constitution so long as the defendant was a major 
participant in the felony and exhibited a reckless 
indifference to human life. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 
S.Ct. at 1688. 
 
However, once the state has defined the elements of an 
offense, the federal Constitution imposes constraints upon 
the state's authority to convict a person of that offense. It 
is well-settled that "the Due Process Clause [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 1073 (1970); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 
at 1242; Francis, 471 U.S. at 316-17, 105 S.Ct. at 1973-74; 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-22, 99 S.Ct. 
2450, 2457-58 (1979). A jury instruction that omits or 
materially misdescribes an essential element of an offense 
as defined by state law relieves the state of its obligation to 
prove facts constituting every element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt, thereby violating the defendant's 
federal due process rights. See Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420 (1989) (per curiam); 
Rock, 959 F.2d at 1245-46; see also Polsky v. Patton, 890 
F.2d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1989) (no due process violation 
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where jury instruction "did not omit any essential element 
of the crime charged"). 
 
This result is not inconsistent with Johnson, 1997 WL 
318064 at *6-8. In that case, the federal habeas petitioner 
contended that the jury instructions concerning 
justification rendered at his Pennsylvania trial for 
aggravated assault, and later affirmed by an intermediate 
appellate court, violated his rights pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause. See id. at *3-5. We noted that a conviction 
for aggravated assault in Pennsylvania required that the 
Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted with malice. See id. at *6. We further noted 
that justification on the part of the defendant would 
necessarily negate a showing of malice. See id. Thus, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant 
acted without justification. See id. The petitioner argued 
that, by misdescribing justification pursuant to 
Pennsylvania law, the trial court violated his Due Process 
rights. See id. He reasoned that the allegedly erroneous 
instruction allowed the Commonwealth to convict him of 
the offense without having proved every element, as 
properly defined, beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. 
 
We rejected this argument, holding that no federal issue 
was raised. See id. at *8. We further held that a federal 
habeas court is bound by the definition given a state 
criminal offense even by intermediate state appellate 
courts. See id. at *10-13. However, in Johnson the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet defined 
justification pursuant to state law. See id. at *4. The 
petitioner simply challenged the definition of that term 
rendered by the state trial and intermediate appellate 
courts, urging that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
rule differently. Thus, Johnson stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that the states are free to define criminal 
offenses in any way they see fit, within certain 
constitutional limitations, even through their lower courts. 
This is so even if the definition they choose makes it 
somewhat easier to convict a person of the offense than 
would be the case under a different definition. Johnson 
most emphatically does not stand for the proposition that, 
once a state has defined a criminal offense, the state may 
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then proceed to convict a person of that offense on anything 
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the 
elements of the offense. Thus, whether a state is relieved of 
that burden via an instruction that omits an element of an 
offense, materially misdescribes that element, or shifts to 
the defendant the burden of proof on that element, the 
result is the same -- the defendant has been denied his 
federal constitutional rights. 
 
The dissent accuses us of holding that "the Due Process 
Clause is violated whenever a state trial judge, in 
instructing a jury on an element of a state offense, gives an 
ambiguous instruction that prejudices the defendant." 
Dissent slip op. at 45-46. We do no such thing. First, 
rather than being "ambiguous," the language must be such 
that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has" 
understood and applied it in a certain way. Supra at 18 
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 
we require more than that the defendant simply be 
"prejudice[d]." Our recent holding in Johnson, 1997 WL 
318064 at *6-8, makes this clear. The standard requires 
that the defendant be prejudiced in a very particular way -- 
it requires that the erroneous instructions have operated to 
lift the burden of proof on an essential element of an 
offense as defined by state law. 
 
The dissent notes that the Supreme Court has never 
expressly held that a jury charge that eases the state's 
burden of proof on an element of an offense by omitting or 
materially misdescribing it violates the Due Process Clause. 
The proposition is true as far as it goes. If our duty as a 
court of appeals were simply to sustain only those claims 
the legal bases for which have already been settled by the 
Supreme Court, the dissent's observation would have some 
relevance. However, our duty also extends to predicting, in 
circumstances where there is no specific guidance, how 
that Court would decide if it were to consider the case 
before us. 
 
Contrary to the dissent's assertions, our holding follows 
inexorably from the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Sandstrom, Franklin, and Carella. As the dissent recognizes, 
those cases "held that the Due Process Clause[i]s violated 
where jury instructions in [a] criminal case[ ] set out either 
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a conclusive presumption or a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption that relieve[s] the prosecution of the burden of 
persuasion on the presumed fact." Dissent slip op. at 46. 
Here, the jury was not instructed on an essential element 
of first-degree murder -- Smith's intent. Instead, as we read 
the charge (and we understand the dissent disputes this 
point) the jury was instructed that as long as either Smith 
or Alston killed Sharp, and as long as Smith and Alston 
were accomplices in the robbery, Smith could be found 
guilty of first-degree murder. This charge was the 
functional equivalent of an instruction that as long as 
either Smith or Alston killed Sharp, and as long as Smith 
and Alston were accomplices in the robbery, the jury should 
conclusively presume that Smith had the intent to kill Sharp, 
and therefore he could be found guilty of first-degree 
murder. Yet the dissent apparently would find that the 
former charge does not violate Smith's constitutional rights, 
because it is not identical in form to the latter, which 
indisputably is repugnant to the Due Process Clause under 
Sandstrom, Franklin, and Carella. 
 
In this case, there is no dispute that Pennsylvania law 
requires the Commonwealth prove specific intent to kill on 
the part of the defendant in order to convict him of first- 
degree murder. The Commonwealth unambiguously 
conceded as much at oral argument. However, the jury was 
instructed that Smith could be found guilty of first-degree 
murder even if it did not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Smith intended for a killing to take place. The 
instruction thus relieved the Commonwealth of the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt facts necessary to 
constitute every element of the offense with which Smith 
was charged. The instruction therefore constituted error 





Finally, we must determine whether the constitutional 




We must first determine whether a jury charge that omits 
or misdescribes an element of an offense can ever be 
harmless. We have explained that 
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[c]onstitutional errors have been categorized as one of 
two types: structural error or trial error. A structural 
error is a defect in the trial mechanism itself, affecting 
the entire trial process, and is per se prejudicial. Trial 
error occurs during the presentation of the case to the 
jury, and may be qualitatively assessed in the context 
of all other evidence. Thus, trial errors are subject to a 
harmless error analysis. 
 
Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 522 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations 
omitted); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
307-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991).5  
 
In California v. Roy, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 337, 339 
(1996) (per curiam), the Supreme Court characterized "an 
error in the instruction that defined the crime" as a trial 
error rather than a structural error. In that case, the 
defendant was accused of aiding a confederate in 
committing first-degree murder. See id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 
337. The trial court had instructed the jury the defendant 
could be convicted if it found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he had knowledge of his cohort's unlawful purpose and 
that the defendant aided him in the commission of the act. 
See id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 337-38. The instruction was 
erroneous under state law because it failed to convey the 
critical idea that the defendant must also have intended to 
aid in the commission of the crime in order to be found 
guilty. See id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 338. 
 
The Roy Court arguably did not decide that all "error[s] in 
the instruction that define[ ] the crime" constitute trial 
error, id. at ___, 117 U.S. at 339, but only that that label 
attaches "to errors that concern fairly narrow departures 
from proper charge language." Peck v. United States, 102 
F.3d 1319, 1325 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1994), we stated 
broadly that "unconstitutional jury instructions" constitute trial error. 
There is at least one type of erroneous jury instruction, however, that 
constitutes structural error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
279-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt charge). 
While most erroneous jury instructions that rise to the level of 
constitutional error will be trial error, we undertake to determine how to 
classify the specific type of instructional error that occurred here. 
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(Newman, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 1326 (Newman, 
C.J., concurring). It may be that a "mere" misstatement of 
an element of an offense is a trial error, while a complete 
omission of an element is a structural error. See Roy, ___ 
U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 339; see also Waldemer v. United 
States, 106 F.3d 729, 736 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc), 
modified, 106 F.3d 1516 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 
65 U.S.L.W. 3632 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1997) (No. 96-1430); cf. 
Peck, 102 F.3d at 1325 (Newman, C.J., concurring). 
 
However, we need not decide this issue. The charge error 
in the instant case is so similar to the one at issue in Roy 
that we believe that this case is controlled by that decision. 
In addition, several pre-Roy decisions from both the 
Supreme Court and this Court all hold that similar types of 
instructional error constitute trial error. See Yates v. Evatt, 
500 U.S. 391, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991) 
(instructions that impermissibly impose mandatory, 
rebuttable presumption on element of offense); Carella, 491 
U.S. at 266, 109 S.Ct. at 2421 (mandatory, conclusive 
presumption); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-82, 106 
S.Ct. 3101, 3106-08 (1986) (mandatory, rebuttable 
presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-03, 107 
S.Ct. 1918, 1921-22 (1987) (instructions that misdescribe 
element of offense in violation of First and Fourteenth 
Amendments); United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 824 
(3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (instructions that effectively 
abridge federal criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to jury unanimity); Kontakis, 19 F.3d at 116 (instructions 
that alter burden of proof on element of offense). We 
conclude that the error that occurred here was trial error, 




In a collateral proceeding, the standard for harmlessness 
is "whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict." Roy, ___ U.S. at 
___, 117 S.Ct. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 
S.Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993); Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523; Alston v. 
Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1252 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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Pursuant to the Brecht standard, 
 
[t]he crucial inquiry is the impact of the error on the 
minds of the jurors in the total setting. It is thus 
inappropriate to ask whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the result, apart from the phase of 
the trial affected by the error. The correct inquiry is 
whether the error had a substantial influence on the 
verdict despite sufficient evidence to support the result 
apart from the error. 
 
Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523 (citations omitted); see also Alston, 34 
F.3d at 1252. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that if a habeas court "is in 
grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error," habeas 
relief must be granted. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 
___, 115 S.Ct. 992, 995 (1995). Thus, if the court concludes 
from the record that the error had a "substantial and 
injurious effect or influence" on the verdict, or if it is in 
"grave doubt" whether that is so, the error cannot be 





We now apply the harmless error analysis set forth above 
to the facts of this case. The Commonwealth urges that this 
error was harmless because the jury's findings, in light of 
the evidence, embrace the finding that Smith actually killed 
Sharp and intended to do so. According to the 
Commonwealth, the harmlessness of the error follows 
syllogistically: (1) the trial court essentially instructed the 
jury that Smith was guilty of first-degree murder if at least 
one of the robbers both killed Sharp and intended to kill 
him; (2) by finding Smith guilty of first-degree murder, the 
jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
either Smith or Alston killed Sharp and intended to do so; 
and (3) because there was evidence that Smith killed Sharp, 
and no evidence that Alston killed Sharp, the jury found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith both killed Sharp 
and intended to do so. 
 
While this reasoning has some superficial appeal, it does 
not withstand close scrutiny. The fundamental flaw arises 
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in the leap from step two to step three of the analysis. The 
jury was never asked to evaluate the respective 
probabilities that Smith or Alston killed Sharp. The verdict 
demonstrates that the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that one of them killed Sharp. The evidence 
supporting this verdict demonstrates that it is more likely 
that Smith, rather than Alston, killed Sharp. However, this 
evidence and the factual findings it supports are not the 
" `functional[ ] equivalent' " of, nor do they "effectively 
embrace[ ]," a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith 
killed Sharp. Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 824 (quoting Carella, 
491 U.S. at 271, 109 S.Ct. 2423-24 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 295 
(1996) (alteration added); Roy, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 
339 (Scalia, J., concurring). We cannot say that a finding 
that either Smith or Alston killed Sharp is " `so closely 
related' " to a finding that Smith killed Sharp, in light of the 
evidence presented, that " `no rational jury' " that made the 
former finding would have failed to make the latter finding. 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 824 (quoting Carella, 491 U.S. at 271, 
109 S.Ct. at 2423-24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 
The strongest evidence that Smith actually killed Sharp 
were his admissions, made immediately after the robbery, 
related at trial by Barrow and Yancey. These two witnesses 
were admitted accomplices to the robbery whose credibility 
was therefore in question. Smith's participation in the 
robbery was well established by independent evidence -- 
the jury did not need to believe either Barrow or Yancey in 
order to find him guilty of robbery and therefore (because of 
the erroneous jury instructions) first-degree murder. It is 
thus unclear whether and to what extent the jury believed 
or disbelieved Barrow and Yancey. Since the jury charge 
did not necessitate that the jury make this determination, 
we can only speculate as to its conclusion with regard to 
Barrow and Yancey's credibility. We cannot assume that 
the jury, having found Smith guilty, "believed all properly 
admitted evidence against him and disbelieved all evidence 
in his favor." ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS 
ERROR 28 (1970). 
 
The situation here is analogous to the one contemplated 
in Yates, 500 U.S. at 405-06, 111 S.Ct. at 1894. In that 
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"mandatory rebuttable presumption" case, the Supreme 
Court cautioned that if it appears that the jury did not 
consider 
 
all the evidence bearing on the issue in question[,] 
before it made the findings on which the verdict rested 
. . . an examination of the entire record would not 
permit any sound conclusion to be drawn about the 
significance of the error to the jury in reaching the 
verdict. . . . [T]he terms of some presumptions so 
narrow the jury's focus as to leave it questionable that 
a reasonable juror would look to anything but the 
evidence establishing the predicate fact in order to infer 
the fact presumed. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). Analogously, the effect of the 
instructions here was to "so narrow the jury's focus as to 
leave it questionable that a reasonable juror would" 
endeavor to answer the rather difficult question whether 
Smith killed Sharp, rather than to rest upon the answers to 
the relatively straightforward questions whether Smith 
participated in the robbery and whether either Smith or 
Alston killed Sharp. 
 
Moreover, the Commonwealth proceeded on the theory 
that Smith was guilty of first-degree murder whether or not 
he intended the victim to be killed. Although the prosecutor 
in summation contended that Smith committed the killing, 
he also repeatedly admonished the jury that it need not 
consider whether Smith actually killed Sharp. See Cross 
App. at 1007-08, 1010, 1012-13, 1014, 1017. Having 
repeatedly urged the jury to base its verdict on a theory 
predicated on a fundamental constitutional error, the 
Commonwealth cannot now seriously contend that that 
error had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence" 
on the verdict. See Yohn, 76 F.3d at 523-24 (repeated 
emphasis by prosecution on importance of erroneously 
admitted evidence demonstrated error was not harmless). 
 
For these reasons, our harmless-error analysis leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that the error here was not 
harmless. Upon a review of the record, we cannot say that 
the error had no "substantial and injurious effect or 
influence" on the jury's verdict. 
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IV. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed to the 
extent that it denied Smith habeas relief with regard to his 
conviction for first-degree murder. The judgment will be 
vacated in all other respects. The matter will be remanded 
to the district court with directions that it conditionally 
order Smith released from confinement. Smith shall be 
released unless the Commonwealth retries him for the 




6. We express no opinion whether, following the grant of habeas relief, 
the Commonwealth may properly move to resentence Smith for any 
lesser included homicide (such as murder or manslaughter where 
specific intent is not an element of the crime). Nor do we express an 
opinion concerning the propriety of the Commonwealth moving to 
resentence Smith on the other crimes for which he was convicted along 
with first-degree murder. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority's decision in this case is troubling. In 1983, 
Clifford Smith was convicted in state court forfirst-degree 
murder. At his trial, the prosecution introduced strong 
evidence that Smith and another man, Roland Alston, 
robbed a pharmacy and that, after the pharmacist was 
ordered to lie face down on the floor, Smith proceeded to 
execute him with a gunshot to the head. Fourteen years 
later, when retrial will almost certainly be difficult at best, 
the majority holds that Smith's federal habeas petition 
must be granted based on a perceived ambiguity in the jury 
instructions. According to the majority, certain references 
to the concept of an "accomplice" are ambiguous in that 
they could be interpreted to mean either " `accomplice in 
the killing,' `accomplice in the robbery,' or both." Maj. Op. 
at 20-21. This supposed ambiguity, the majority concludes, 
not only created confusion about the requirements of state 
law but rose to the level of a federal due process violation. 
e majority takes this course even though (1) the trial 
judge, before making the references to "accomplice" 
that the majority finds to be ambiguous, provided an 
accurate and detailed definition of that term which, if 
read into all of the challenged references, renders them 
accurate; (2) Smith's attorney did not object at trial to 
the relevant portions of the jury charge; and (3) Smith 
never argued in either of his two appeals to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that these portions of the 
jury instructions violated either state law or the Due 
Process Clause. Under these circumstances, I cannot agree 




An important threshold question is whether Smith 
exhausted state remedies. Although the Commonwealth has 
not raised this issue, I believe that we should nevertheless 
address it under the circumstances present here.1 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this opinion, I rely on the caselaw regarding exhaustion and 
procedural default as they existed prior to the enactment of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 
 
                                35 
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987), the 
Supreme Court stated that "both comity and judicial 
efficiency" might make it appropriate for a court to raise the 
issue of exhaustion on its own where a case "presents an 
issue on which an unresolved question of fact or of state 
law might have an important bearing." 481 U.S. at 134-35. 
The present case falls squarely within this description. As 
noted, the majority's decision is founded upon its 
conclusion that the jury instructions inaccurately explained 
Pennsylvania's rule of accomplice liability. Before 
considering whether this purported misstatement of state 
law rose to the level of a federal due process violation, it 
would be helpful to have the benefit of a decision by the 
Pennsylvania courts on the underlying issue of state law. 
 
We have no such decision, however, because Smith did 
not challenge the relevant portions of the jury instructions 
on any ground in either of his two appeals to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Not only did he fail to raise 
the federal due process claim on which the majority's 
decision rests, but he did not even contend that the 
instructions misstated state law.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
110 Stat. 1221, which became law on April 24, 1996, after Smith's 
federal habeas petition was filed. Under a provision of that Act applicable 
to a state prisoner under a capital sentence, a district court is generally 
precluded from considering a claim unless it was "raised and decided on 
the merits in the State courts." 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a). This provision 
applies to federal habeas petitions already pending when the Act became 
law. See Lindh v. Murphy, 1997 WL 338568 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 23, 
1997). However, this provision applies only if a state satisfies certain 
conditions, see U.S.C. § 2261, and in Death Row Prisoners of 
Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35, 36 (3d Cir. 1997), the 
Commonwealth declared, and our court agreed, that Pennsylvania did 
not meet the requirements of § 2261 as of January 31, 1997. It therefore 
appears that § 2264(a) is inapplicable here. Under the current version of 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3), consideration of the issue of exhaustion would be 
required. However, Smith's petition was filed before this provision took 
effect. See Lindh, supra. 
 
2. On direct appeal, Smith argued that the trial judge erred in refusing 
to give three instructions requested by the defense, namely, Nos. 8, 11, 
and 12. Number 8 defined first degree murder; number 11 defined 
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Although Smith did not exhaust state remedies, "[a] 
petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies is . . . excused 
. . . when state law `clearly foreclose[s] state court review of 
[the] unexhausted claims.' " Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 
680 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 
987 (3d Cir. 1993)). Here, the Pennsylvania courts might 
well hold that review of Smith's claim is foreclosed under 
the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S. 
§§ 9541-46 (Supp. 1996). In Doctor, 96 F.3d at 681, we 
explained that under Pennsylvania law 
 
"[a]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised 
it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary 
review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
involuntary manslaughter; and number 12 defined the terms 
"intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently." None of these 
requested instructions related to the claim on which the majority relies. 
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected Smith's argument 
regarding the requested instructions on involuntary manslaughter on the 
ground that the evidence at trial did not support such a charge. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 513 A.2d 1371, 1377-78 (Pa. 1986). The court 
rejected Smith's argument concerning the other two requested 
instructions on the ground that the substance of those requests was 
adequately covered by the trial judge. The state supreme court wrote: 
 
It is established that a trial court is not required to accept points 
submitted by counsel verbatim, but rather is free to select its own 
forms of expression. Commonwealth v. McComb, 462 Pa. 504, 509, 
341 A.2d 496, 498 (1975). "The only issue is whether the area is 
adequately, accurately and clearly presented to the jury for their 
consideration." Id. We have reviewed the record in the present case 
and find no inadequacies in the trial court's instructions as to 
elements of the crime of murder of the first degree and as to 
pertinent requirements of criminal culpability. 
 
513 A.2d at 1377. 
 
This passage cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that the state 
supreme court sua sponte considered the federal due process claim now 
before us. Indeed, it would be utterly unrealistic to interpret the court's 
statements to mean even that it had rejected all possible objections to 
the instructions that might be raised under state law. To go further and 
read that statement as a rejection of an unraised federal due process 
claim would be absurd. 
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proceeding." [42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.] § 9544(b). As the 
Pennsylvania courts have noted, "nearly all claims are 
waived under the PCRA since nearly all claims 
potentially could have been raised on direct appeal 
. . . . Commonwealth v. Eaddy, 419 Pa. Super. 48, 614 
A.2d 1203, 1207-08 (1992), appeal denied, 534 Pa. 
636, 626 A.2d 1155 (1993); accord Commonwealth v. 
Stark, 442 Pa. Super. 127, 658 A.2d 816, 820 (1995). 
 
We recognized, however, that PCRA review might not be 
foreclosed if a petitioner is "able to demonstrate a 
`miscarriage of justice' warranting `departure from the 
PCRA's stringent eligibility requirements.' " Doctor, 96 F.3d 
at 681 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fiore, 445 Pa. Super. 
401, 665 A.2d ll85, 1193 (1995) (Hoffman, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1243 (1996)). I 
question whether at this time the Pennsylvania courts 
would entertain Smith's challenge to the jury instructions, 
but I would certainly request briefing from the parties on 
this question. 
 
If, as seems likely, PCRA review is foreclosed because of 
Smith's failure to raise his federal due process claim in the 
prior state-court proceedings, we should consider the 
doctrine of procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 735 n.* (1991). This doctrine, like 
exhaustion, has not been raised by the Commonwealth, but 
I believe that we should apply this doctrine nevertheless. 
Our court, see Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 164 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1991), and many others have held that procedural 
default may be raised sua sponte by a court of appeals. 
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502-04 & n.4 (10th 
Cir. 1992).3 In Washington , the Second Circuit explained 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Cf. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (non-jurisdictional 
Teague rule may but need not be raised by federal court sua sponte; 
Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134-35 (same for exhaustion); Patsy v. Board of 
Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 498, 515 n.19 (1982) (same for Eleventh 
Amendment defense). Compare Trest v. Cain, 94 F.3d 1005 (5th Cir. 
1996), petition for cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1842 (1997) (presenting 
question whether court of appeals is required to raise procedural 
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that "[p]rinciples of comity and federalism bear on the 
relations between court systems, and those relations will be 
affected whether or not the litigants have raised the issue 
themselves." 996 F.2d at 1448. In Hardiman, the Tenth 
Circuit, quoting our opinion in Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 
395, 398 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a court could raise 
exhaustion sua sponte), stated that it was appropriate for a 
court to raise the issue of procedural default because it 
implicates " `values that may transcend the concerns of the 
parties to [the] action.' " 971 F.2d at 502. 
 
In Ortiz, the First Circuit, when confronted with a federal 
constitutional claim closely resembling Smith's, held that it 
was appropriate to raise the issue of procedural default on 
its own motion. The petitioner in Ortiz, argued that "his 
right to due process was violated because the jury was not 
properly instructed on the elements of felony-murder under 
Massachusetts law, and therefore did not find every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." 19 F.3d 
at 710. Although the petitioner argued on direct appeal that 
the instructions were deficient, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts declined to review his claim on the merits 
because he had not objected to the instructions at trial. Id. 
at 713. Instead, the Supreme Judicial Court "limited its 
inquiry to whether the error gave rise to a substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice." Id. at 714. Accordingly, 
the First Circuit found that "the state procedural default 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
default). The petition in Trest argues that, under Gray v. Netherland, 116 
S.Ct. 2080, 2082 (1996), procedural default is an affirmative defense 
that is lost if not properly raised by the state. But while it is certainly 
true that a state may lose the "right" to have the doctrine of procedural 
default considered if it does not properly raise that issue, see Gray, 116 
S.Ct. at 2082, it is far from clear that Gray meant to go further and say 
that the lower federal courts lack the discretion to raise the issue on 
their own. See id. (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1994) 
(refusing as a matter of discretion to consider Teague bar where not 
raised at cert. petition stage), and Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
234 n.1 (1980) (refusing to consider procedural default where raised for 
the first time in Supreme Court). 
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[was] clear on the face of the record," and thus found it 
unnecessary to review the merits of the petitioner's claim.4 
 
Like the First Circuit in Ortiz, I think that it is 
appropriate for us to raise the issue of procedural default in 
this case on our own motion, particularly since Smith's 
federal constitutional claim is grounded on an issue of state 
law. Since Smith has not had an opportunity to address the 
issue of procedural default, I would request further briefing 
on that issue before determining whether there is any basis 
for excusing default in this case. 
 
The majority refuses to consider the issues of exhaustion 
and procedural default -- indeed, refuses even to request 
briefing on these serious issues. The majority voices 
concern that consideration of these issues would "result in 
undue delay." Maj. Op. 13; see also id. at 12. This concern 
is curious -- and not only because of the pace of the post- 
conviction proceedings to date. Consideration of procedural 
default would not simply delay a decision on the merits of 
Smith's claim; rather, it holds the potential for precluding 
a decision on the merits of that claim. If the claim is 
procedurally defaulted, if Smith cannot show cause and 
prejudice, and if no other exception applies (questions on 
which I express no view without hearing from the parties), 
then neither the state nor the federal courts would decide 
the merits of Smith's claim. Obviously, then, the refusal to 
consider procedural default cannot be defended on the 
ground that to do so would only delay an inevitable 
decision on the merits. 
 
The majority also contends that the jury instructions 
resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." As I show below, 
however, the instructions at issue here were at most 
ambiguous -- and that is undoubtedly why they did not 
even elicit an objection from Smith's trial counsel, why 
challenges to these instructions were not included among 
the numerous arguments raised in Smith's two appeals to 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and why the district 
court judge in this federal habeas corpus proceeding 
thought that the alleged errors that the majority is willing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The First Circuit did state that it would have rejected the claim even 
if it had reached the merits. 
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to label "a miscarriage of justice" were meritless and did not 
even warrant discussion. See Smith v. Horn, 1996 WL 
172047 (E.D. Pa. 1996), page 12. 
 
There is one reasonable argument that can be made in 
support of the conclusion that we should not raise the 
doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default on our own, 
i.e., that these doctrines, which serve to protect state 
prerogatives, should be raised by the state's attorneys. But, 
as I previously noted, our court and others have recognized 
that the values served by these doctrines "may transcend 
the concerns of the parties to an action." Brown v. Fauver, 
819 F.2d at 398. 
 
Aiming to curb federal habeas corpus abuses, 
particularly in death penalty cases, Congress endorsed this 
view when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1221. In 
capital cases subject to chapter 154, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66, 
Congress prohibited federal courts from considering a claim 
unless it was "raised and decided on the merits in the State 
courts." 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a). In other cases, Congress 
provided that a state may not be deemed to have waived 
exhaustion unless it does so expressly. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(3). These new provisions do not apply here (see 
footnote 1, supra), but they are animated by the same 
respect for the state court systems that informed our 
court's prior decisions. Accordingly, I believe that we should 
not proceed to review the merits of Smith's due process 
claim without considering the issues of exhaustion and 
procedural default. However, since the majority has skipped 
over these questions and plunged into the merits of Smith's 
federal constitutional claim, I will address the merits of that 




A. The Pennsylvania rule of accomplice liability is as 
follows: 
 
When causing a particular result is an element of an 
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such 
result is an accomplice in the commission of that 
offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, 
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with respect to that result that it is sufficient for the 
commission of the offense. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 306(d) (emphasis added). An 
"accomplice" is defined in pertinent part as follows: 
 
A person is an accomplice of another person in the 
commission of an offense if: 
 
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offense, he: 
 
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or 
 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other 
person in planning or committing it. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 306(c) (emphasis added). Thus, in 
order for an "accomplice" to be criminally responsible for a 
particular offense, the "accomplice" must have "the intent 
of promoting or facilitating the offense" -- which means 
that the accomplice must at a minimum possess the intent 
necessary for conviction of that offense as a principal. 
 
In this case, Smith was charged with first degree murder, 
robbery, possession of instruments of crime, and 
conspiracy. The trial judge instructed the jury on the 
elements of all of these offenses, as well as the lesser 
included homicide offenses of second and third degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
 
Before setting out the elements of these offenses, 
however, the trial judge instructed the jury on the 
principles of accomplice liability, which were relevant, not 
only to the first degree murder charge, but to all of the 
other substantive offenses as well. The trial judge 
accurately stated that an accomplice is criminally 
responsible for the acts of the principal. CA 1028. 
"Therefore," the court stated, "it is necessary that you 
understand and that we spell out what is meant under our 
Crimes Code by the term accomplice." See CA 1028-29. 
Tracking the language of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 306(c)(1), the trial judge then explained that a person is 
an accomplice "if with the intent of promoting or facilitating 
the commission of a crime he solicits, commands, 
encourages or requests the other person or persons to 
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commit that crime or crimes, or aids, agrees to aid, or 
attempts to aid the other person in the planning or 
committing the crime." Id. (emphasis added). Under this 
instruction, as under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 306(c), a 
person can be an accomplice with respect to the 
commission of a particular crime only if that person has 
"the intent of promoting or facilitating" the commission of 
"that crime." 
 
When a trial judge, in instructing a jury, provides a 
definition of a complicated legal term, the judge is not 
generally required to repeat that definition every time the 
term is subsequently employed. Rather, the judge may 
reasonably rely on the prior definition, and that is what the 
trial judge did here -- without objection. If the previously 
provided definition is read into the instructions whenever 
the judge referred to an "accomplice," the judge's 
instructions are correct. Under this procedure, every 
reference to "an accomplice" should be read as a reference 
to an "accomplice" with respect to the particular offense or 
offenses that the judge is discussing. In finding that certain 
references to the concept of an "accomplice" are ambiguous, 
the majority ignores the significance of the definition that 
preceded these references. 
 
For example, the majority holds (Maj. Op. 18-19) that the 
trial judge violated due process when he gave the following 
instruction: 
 
[T]he elements of first degree murder are the unlawful 
killing of another person done intentionally; that is, 
willfully, deliberately and with premeditation, plus 
malice, as I will define that term to you. If these 
elements are established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you may, on the theory that one was the perpetrator 
and the other the accomplice, find Clifford Smith guilty 
of murder in the first degree . . . . 
 
CA 1035. The majority finds this instruction objectionable 
because it did not clearly convey the message that, if Alston 
pulled the trigger, Smith could be convicted of first degree 
murder only if Smith was Alston's " `accomplice in the 
killing' and not simply [his] accomplice in the robbery.' " 
Maj. Op. 19. But if the previously supplied definition of an 
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"accomplice" is applied, this alleged ambiguity is dispelled. 
As noted, an "accomplice" must have the intent required for 
the offense in question (see Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 306(c); 
CA 1029); therefore, to be an accomplice in a first degree 
murder a person must have the intent required for that 
offense, i.e., the person must act intentionally, willfully, 
deliberately, and with premeditation. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2502(a), (d). 
 
To be sure, if Smith's trial attorney had objected to this 
and the other instructions at issue on the ground that they 
were suspectable to the misinterpretation that troubles the 
majority, if the trial judge had overruled this objection, if 
the objection had been raised on direct appeal, and if we 
sat on a Pennsylvania appellate court, rather than a federal 
court, I could understand a decision requiring a new trial. 
But for a federal appeals court to order a new trial 14 years 
later based on such a previously unchallenged ambiguity is 
shocking. 
 
The remaining portions of the instructions that the 
majority has singled out are similar. The majority objects 
(Maj. Op. 19-20) to certain instructions in which the trial 
judge attempted to explain in generic terms the application 
of the principles of accomplice liability to any of the 
homicide offenses that were before the jury, i.e.,first, 
second, and third degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter. See CA 1030-32. Probably because he was 
speaking about all of these offenses at the same time, the 
judge did not at this point specify the intent required for 
conviction for each offense (he did that a few pages later), 
but if the definition of an accomplice that he gave on the 
previous page is applied, the challenged instructions were 
correct. In retrospect, one might argue that it was 
inadvisable for the trial judge to have attempted to explain 
in one breath how the principles of accomplice liability 
relate to all four of the homicide offenses that were before 
the jury, and one might fault the particular language that 
the judge chose. But I see nothing in these instructions 
that justifies federal habeas relief.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The majority goes so far as to cite alleged ambiguities in the 
instructions on criminal conspiracy as support for its decision to strike 
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Having identified what is at most an ambiguity in the 
jury instructions on a point of state law, the majority 
alchemizes this ambiguity into a violation of the Due 
Process Clause. The majority writes: 
 
In this case, the misapplication of state law resulted in 
a federal constitutional error. It is well-settled that "the 
Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] 
protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 1073 (1970); see also Victor, [v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1, -- (1994), 511 U.S. 114 S.Ct. -- 1242 (19 ); 
Francis, 471 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1973; Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458 
(1979). A jury instruction that omits or materially 
misdescribes an essential element of an offense as 
defined by state law relieves the state of its obligation 
to prove facts constituting every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating the 
defendant's federal due process rights. See Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420 
(1989) (per curiam); Rock, 959 F.2d at 1245-46; see 
also Polsky v. Patton, 890 F.2d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(no due process violation where jury instruction "did 
not omit any essential element of the crime charged"). 
 
Maj. Op. at 25. 
 
In essence, the majority holds that the Due Process 
Clause is violated whenever a state judge, in instructing a 
jury on an element of a state offense, gives an ambiguous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
down Smith's first degree murder conviction. See Maj. Op. 18-19; CA 
1047-48. This argument is far-fetched indeed. By this point in the 
instructions, the trial judge had turned to the last "remaining crimes in 
the Information, . . . the crimes of criminal conspiracy to commit the 
various robberies . . . criminal conspiracy to commit first degree murder 
and murder and criminal conspiracy to commit the act of possession of 
instruments of crime." CA. 1043. If there were any serious flaws in these 
instructions -- and I see none -- they could at most undermine Smith's 
conspiracy conviction, not his conviction for first degree murder. 
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instruction that prejudices the defendant -- even if defense 
counsel does not object. None of the decisions cited by the 
majority supports this holding. In Winship, the Supreme 
Court held that the Due Process Clause requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to support a finding that a 
juvenile committed an act that would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult. Sandstrom, Francis, and Carella all 
held that the Due Process Clause was violated where jury 
instructions in criminal cases set out either a conclusive 
presumption or a mandatory rebuttable presumption that 
relieved the prosecution of the burden of persuasion on the 
presumed fact. Victor reviewed instructions that defined the 
concept of reasonable doubt. No Supreme Court case cited 
by the majority -- or any other Supreme Court decision of 
which I am aware -- has held that the Due Process Clause 
is violated whenever a state trial judge, in instructing a jury 
on the elements of a state offense, uses ambiguous 
language that prejudices the defendant. Nor is the 
majority's decision supported by either of the Third Circuit 
cases it cites. In Rock, 959 F.2d at 1245-46, we merely 
restated in dicta the holdings of Winship and Sandstrom. In 
Polsky, we held that a particular instruction conveyed the 
essence of the element that was allegedly omitted. 890 F.2d 
at 651. 
 
Although not cited by the majority, the Supreme Court 
opinion that appears to be most closely on point, 
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977), cuts against the 
majority's argument. In Henderson, a federal court of 
appeals, relying on Winship, ordered that federal habeas 
corpus relief be granted because the trial judge (without 
objection) failed to instruct the jury on an essential element 
of the offense of second-degree murder. Reversing, the 
Supreme Court wrote: 
 
 Orderly procedure requires that the respective 
adversaries' views as to how the jury should be 
instructed be presented to the trial judge in time to 
enable him to deliver an accurate charge and to 
minimize the risk of committing reversible error. It is 
the rare case in which an improper instruction will 
justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no 
objection has been made in the trial court. 
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 The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous 
instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a 
collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state 
court's judgment is even greater than the showing 
required to establish plain error on direct appeal. The 
question in such a collateral proceeding is "whether the 
ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial 
that the resulting conviction violates due process," 
Capp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 147, not merely whether 
"the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even 
`universally condemned,' " id. at 146. 
 
431 U.S. at 154 (footnotes omitted). 
 
Here, the instructions cited by the majority did not " `so 
infect[ ] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates 
due process.' " Id. (citation omitted). Thus, I would reject 
Smith's due process claim. 
 
It is a cardinal principle that "it is not the province of a 
federal habeas court to reexamine state court 
determinations on state law questions. In conducting 
habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether 
a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 
(1991). Our court has emphasized this important rule. 
Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(en banc); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 309 (3rd 
Cir. 1991). Cf. Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 1997 WL 318064, (3d 
Cir. June 13, 1997). The majority's extension of Winship 
and related precedents threatens to undermine this 
important principle and to claim for a federal habeas court 
the power to decide, long after a state trial has been 
completed, whether previously unchallenged jury 
instructions set out the requirements of state law with 
sufficient clarity to satisfy the federal court's taste. "[I]t is 
difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty 
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to 
conform their conduct to state law." Pennhurst State School 
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). The 
majority's decision here not only works an injustice in an 
important case but it creates a dangerous precedent. I 
must therefore dissent. 
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